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A Critical Analysis of the Case-Law of the  
European Court of Human Rights on  
Blood Transfusion and Religious Beliefs 
 
Javier Martínez-Torrón
*
 
 
 
 
Introductory Remarks 
The topic of this conference is indeed a most interesting one, for 
conscientious objection to blood transfusions involves a conflict between two 
fundamental rights of particular significance: the right to life, without which no 
other right has any meaning, and the right to religious freedom, which guarantees 
that people are free to take the most essential choices in their lives. As in other 
conflicts of fundamental freedoms,
1
 the State, being obliged to protect both 
                                            
* Javier Martínez-Torrón, Professor of Law, Director of the Department of Law and Religion, 
Complutense University, Madrid. 
 This paper reflects my presentation at the International Conference on “Blood Transfusions and 
Religious Beliefs”, organised by the University of Nicosia Department of Law, 26-27 February 
2010. I am very grateful to the University of Nicosia, and especially to Professor Achilles C. 
Emilianides, for their kind invitation to participate in that conference. This paper has been 
written within the framework of the following research projects: Project P2007/HUM-0403, 
funded by the Autonomous Community of Madrid; Project DER2008-05283, funded by the 
Spanish Ministry of education; Project RELIGARE (Nr. 244635), funded by the European 
Commission; and Research Group 940091, funded by Complutense University (call GR58/08, 
Banco Santander). 
1  Think, for instance, of the clash between freedom of expression and freedom of religion, which 
has attracted much attention in recent years. See, with respect to the European Court of 
Human Rights case law on these issues, J. Martínez-Torrón, ‘Freedom of Expression versus 
Freedom of Religion in the European Court of Human Rights’ in A. Sajo, (ed.), Censorial 
Sensitivities: Free Speech and Religion in a Fundamentalist World, Budapest, 2007, pp. 233-269. 
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freedoms, must engage in a balancing process to determine which of them must 
prevail in any one particular case. This is not an easy task at all, at least for those 
of us who are persuaded that the State, when limiting a fundamental freedom, 
must endeavour to use the least restrictive means. This often implies the refusal 
to resort to ‘simple’ solutions, which may unduly impair the fundamental rights of 
citizens. 
These observations are particularly applicable to the conflict we consider 
here, for many people may be inclined to think that, when the right to life is in 
danger, no other right or freedom should be taken into consideration, without any 
further nuance. This would be, in my view, the typical case of a too ‘simple’ 
solution that ignores the complexities involved in an accurate and refined 
protection of human rights. 
The issue of refusal of blood transfusions is, of course, not exclusive to Cyprus, 
and neither is it exclusive to Jehovah’s Witnesses. Although typically the 
adherents of this religion have an absolute rejection, on conscience grounds, of 
blood transfusions, there are other religions that go even beyond and refuse most 
medical treatments of any kind.
2
 Here, I will focus on the issue of blood 
transfusions and on the attitude of Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
1. Tendencies in Comparative Law 
With respect to conscientious objection to blood transfusions, and to medical 
treatments in general, the tendencies in comparative law vary according to two 
initial and important distinctions: on the one hand, the situation of adults and 
minors, respectively; and on the other hand, whether or not the treatments are 
necessary to prevent a serious risk for the life or health of the patient
3
 − most 
often, the issue of blood transfusions arise when they are deemed essential to 
save the patient’s life.  
In the case of adults, the rule generally is that the free choice of individuals 
prevails even over the protection of the right to life. The reason is the guarantee 
of religious freedom as well as that of the right to privacy, which requires the 
informed consent of adults as a sine qua non for any medical intervention on their 
                                            
2  See, for further references, R. Navarro-Valls & J. Martínez-Torrón, Las objeciones de conciencia 
en derecho español y comparado, Madrid, 1997, pp. 119 et seq. (there is an updated and much 
extended edition forthcoming). 
3  See, for further details, R. Navarro-Valls & J. Martínez-Torrón, ‘La objeción de conciencia a 
tratamientos médicos’ in Base de Conocimiento Jurídico, Iustel (www.iustel.com). 
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bodies − except, of course, in emergency cases when the person is unconscious 
and cannot express any opinion. 
In the case of minors the rule is just the opposite when there is a serious 
threat for the life or health of the minor in question. The right to life must prevail 
and medical treatments − blood transfusions included − can be imposed when the 
physicians in charge consider them necessary. The procedures to follow in these 
cases vary from country to country.
4
 Very often, the judge decrees a temporary 
removal of the right to custody from the parents and authorises the physicians to 
perform the blood transfusion. Once the medical problem is solved and the child 
has recovered, the custody is returned to the parents. One of the issues that often 
arise in this type of case is the extent to which the judge must listen to the minor 
before removing the custody from the parents and authorising the transfusion. 
This will depend on the age and maturity of the child in question − the more 
mature the child is the more obliged the judge is to listen to him. However, judges 
almost always authorise transfusions when the probabilities of danger for the 
minor’s life are high. 
Although these rules seem clear and simple, the reality is much more complex 
and difficult, as illustrated by some examples. In the United States,
5
 for instance, 
the courts have imposed medical treatments on pregnant women, or on parents 
with young children in their care, considering that the protection of the rights of 
the unborn child or of the young children were legal interests important enough 
to justify the limitation on the parents’ right to religious freedom (and on the 
intangibility of their bodies).
6
 
                                            
4  See, for further details and references, R. Navarro-Valls, J. Martínez-Torrón & M.A. Jusdado, ‘La 
objeción de conciencia a tratamientos médicos: Derecho comparado y Derecho español’ in Las 
relaciones entre la Iglesia y el Estado. Estudios en memoria del Profesor Pedro Lombardía, 
Madrid, 1989, especially pp. 911-915, 925-928 & 936-949 (this essay is also published in: [1988] 
Persona y Derecho 163-277). 
5  The case-law of the United States is especially rich in dealing with these situations. For an 
interesting and comprehensive study, by a Spanish professor, with abundant bibliographical 
references, see R. Palomino, Las objeciones de conciencia: Conflictos entre conciencia y ley en el 
derecho norteamericano, Madrid, 1994, pp. 255-355. Among US legal literature, see H.L. Hirsh & H. 
Phifer, ‘The Interface of Medicine, Religion and the Law: Religious Objections to Medical Treatment’ 
[1985] Medicine and Law 121-139; and M.L. Moore, ‘Their Life is in the Blood: Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Blood Transfusions and the Courts’ (1982-1983) 10 North Kentucky Law Review 281-304. 
6  See, for instance, Matter of Melideo, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 523 (1976); Application of the President and 
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Raleigh-Fitkin-Paul 
Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964); John F. Kennedy 
Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); In re Baby Doe, N.E.2d 
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In a number of countries, one of the greatest concerns has been whether 
objector parents are criminally liable when a child dies out of negligence in 
providing a blood transfusion or other medical treatment necessary to preserve 
his life. The responses of the courts to this delicate issue have been diverse, and 
sometimes depend on the degree of cooperation (or lack of cooperation) 
provided by the objector parents.
7
 In Spain, the Constitutional Court has held that 
parents are exempt from criminal responsibility if they adopted a passive 
cooperative attitude with respect to the intervention of the medical team but 
refused to actively cooperate to persuade their child – a minor, aged 13 − to 
accept a blood transfusion that he had refused.
8
 
Another interesting issue, especially within the European system of 
healthcare, is whether the State has some economic liability when a public 
hospital refuses to perform a surgical intervention without a blood transfusion, as 
requested by the patient, but the same intervention is later performed by a 
private clinic without transfusion − with the consequence that the patient had to 
pay a large sum of money for an intervention that, in principle, was covered by his 
social security and would, therefore, have cost him less if performed in the public 
hospital. The issue is controversial but the trend is to deny that the patient has 
any right to be reimbursed for the expenses he incurred because his intervention 
has been carried out in a way compatible with his religious beliefs.
9
 
2. The European Court of Human Rights and the Rights of Individual 
Conscience 
With respect to the rights of individual conscience the attitude of the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’) has been 
arguably less protective than with respect to the corporate dimension of freedom 
of religion.
10
 This seems awkward, considering that the European Convention 
                                                                                                               
(unpublished: 1979); In the matter of an unnamed “infant”, child of Cheryl and Anthony 
Lancaster, No. C121-4104, Court of Chancery for the State of Delaware, 21 August 1981. 
7  See R. Navarro-Valls, J. Martínez-Torrón & M.A. Jusdado, ‘La objeción de conciencia a 
tratamientos médicos’, cited in n. 4 above, pp. 915-919, 933-938 & 940-943. 
8  See STC 154/2002, 18 July 2002. 
9  See for instance, in Spain, STC 166/1996 (Constitutional Court), 28 October 1996 (with an 
interesting dissenting opinion); and STS 4926/2009, 25 June 2009 (Rec. No. 3404/2008, Sala de 
lo Social, Sección 1ª). 
10  See J. Martínez-Torrón & R. Navarro-Valls, ‘The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System 
of the Council of Europe’ in T. Lindholm, W.C. Durham & B.G. Tahzib-Lie, Facilitating Freedom of 
Religion or Belief: A Deskbook, Leiden, 2004, pp. 228-236. 
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(hereinafter ‘ECHR’), like all international documents on human rights, looks at 
the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion as a right that belongs primarily 
to individuals − on a conceptual level, the right of religious groups appears to be 
derivative from the individual’s right. In any event, the Court’s approach has not 
been very clear until now. 
The problem of insufficient protection of individual freedom of religion or 
belief arises from the terminology utilised by the European Convention and most 
other international texts that describe the content of the freedom of religion and 
belief. Among the aspects of this freedom that deserve protection, article 9(1) 
ECHR mentions the right to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, teaching, 
practice, and observance. If we focus on the term practice, the most obvious 
interpretation seems to be that article 9 guarantees the right of individuals to 
behave in accordance with the prohibitions and dictates of their own consciences. 
It does not seem accurate to interpret the term practice as the mere practice of 
rites, considering that the ritual dimension of religious freedom is referred to in 
other terms used in article 9, in particular with the words worship and observance. 
For the rest, the guarantee offered by article 9 should be granted irrespective of 
whether these practices are based on the tenets of an institutional religion or 
derive from strictly personal beliefs and whether or not the individual’s 
conscience is grounded on religious or non-religious beliefs. Of course, this 
guarantee is necessarily limited according to article 9(2). 
This broad construction of the right to manifest one’s belief in practice has 
been proposed by the General Comment of the Committee of Human Rights on 
article 18 of the 1966 UN International Covenant on Human Rights.
11
 I am afraid, 
however, that the attitude of the Strasbourg jurisdiction has been different with 
regard to article 9 of the European Convention. I will try to summarise their 
approach to this question below.
12
 
The ECtHR’s case law has stressed the need to distinguish between the 
internal and external aspects of religious liberty. The former is the freedom to 
believe, which embraces the freedom to choose one’s beliefs − religious or non-
                                            
11  The General Comment on article 18 was adopted by the Committee on 20 July 1993 (General 
Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18): 30/07/93; 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, General Comment No. 22). For an analysis of the text, see B.G. Tahzib, 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring Effective Legal Protection, The Hague, 1996, pp. 307-
375. 
12  On this subject, see also M.D. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, 
Cambridge, 1997, pp. 293 et seq; and C. Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Oxford, 2001, pp. 67 et seq. & 168 et seq. 
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religious − and the freedom to change one’s religion. The latter consists of the 
freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief. The internal dimension of religious 
freedom is absolute and may not be restricted, while the freedom to manifest 
religious beliefs in action is by its very nature relative and may be subjected to the 
restrictions specified in article 9(2).
13
  
All this seems indisputable and is reflected in the notion that the State cannot 
judge on the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the means that believers choose to 
express them.
14
 As a consequence, public authorities can neither take nor permit 
any direct action to impel the citizens to believe or not to believe in something. 
For this reason, in the Kjeldsen case in 1976, the Court held that the State, when 
organising the educational system, is not allowed to develop any activities that 
amount to indoctrinating the students with a particular religious or moral view of 
life contrary to the convictions of their parents.
15
 In a similar direction, the Court 
                                            
13  This distinction, which has already been made by the European Commission of Human Rights, 
disappeared in 1998. See App. 10358/83, C. v. United Kingdom, 37 Decisions and Reports 147, 
Dec., in which the Commission utilises the expression ‘forum internum’. The same doctrine is 
reiterated in App. No. 10678/83 and 14049/88, V. v. The Netherlands, 39 Decisions and Reports 
268. See also App. 11581/85, Darby v. Sweden, Rep. Com, 9 May 1989, § 44. The Court, following 
the Commission’s approach, has subsequently alluded to this double side of religious freedom and 
has emphasised that the limits stated in article 9(2) are applicable only to the freedom to manifest 
one’s religion or belief but not to the freedom to choose one’s religion or belief. See App. 14307/88, 
Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, §§ 31 & 33.  
14  ‘[…] But for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the 
Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious 
beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate’. See App. 18748/91, 
Manoussakis et al. v. Greece, Judgment of 26 September 1996, § 47; App. 30985/96, Hasan and 
Chaush v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 26 October 2000; § 78; App. 45701/99, Metropolitan Church of 
Bessarabia v. Moldova, Judgment of 13 December 2001, § 123; App. 72881/01, Moscow Branch 
of the Salvation Army v. Russia, Judgment of 5 October 2006, § 92. 
15  Apps. No. 5095/71, 5920/72 & 5926/72, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 
Judgment of 7 December 1976. This case related to the conscientious objection of some 
parents to the implementation of a new system of sex education in public schools intended to 
prevent undesired pregnancies among teenagers. The decision − favourable to the Danish 
government − focused on the interpretation of article 2 of the First Protocol (right to education 
and right of parents concerning their children’s education). The same doctrine has been 
reaffirmed in more recent cases involving religious education: App. 15472/02, Folgerø v. 
Norway, Judgment of 29 June 2007, and App. 1448/04, Zengin v. Turkey, Judgment of 9 October 
2007, both decided in favour of the applicants (for a comment on those decisions, see M.A. 
Jusdado & S. Cañamares, ‘La objeción de conciencia en el ámbito educativo. Comentario a la 
Sentencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos Folgerø v. Noruega’; and J. Martínez-
Torrón, ‘La objeción de conciencia a la enseñanza religiosa y moral en la reciente jurisprudencia 
A Critical Analysis of the Case-Law of the ECtHR on Blood Transfusion & Religious Beliefs          25 
 
 
sustained, in the Buscarini case, that a citizen cannot be compelled to take an 
oath on the Gospels as a requirement to hold a public office voluntarily assumed − 
this would be equivalent to forcing him to express a religious belief against his 
will.
16
 
However, the crucial issue is understanding the protection of the freedom of 
individuals to act or practice according to the dictates of their own conscience, an 
issue that is closely connected with the problem of conflicts between law and 
conscience, between legal and moral duties. In my opinion, the analytical 
framework proposed by the European jurisdiction is not the most appropriate. Its 
approach has consisted mainly in drawing a line of separation between the 
concepts of manifestation and motivation. From this perspective, the European 
Convention would not necessarily guarantee the right to practice any particular 
external behaviour adapted to one’s belief. In other words, the term practice does 
not include each and every act motivated or influenced by a religion or belief.
17
  
This approach seems reasonable in abstract, for behaviour obliged by 
conscience − which seems to be the behaviour protected by article 9 − is different 
from behaviour simply permitted by conscience. Nevertheless, the truth is that 
the Strasbourg case law reveals a rather restrictive attitude. In particular, it has 
tended to consider that the protective umbrella of article 9 does not necessarily 
extend to an individual’s behaviour imposed by his own conscience, especially 
                                                                                                               
de Estrasburgo’, both in (2007) 15 Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico 
del Estado (www.iustel.com).  
16  App. 24645/94, Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, Judgment of 18 February 1999. Other 
recent cases on public oaths, with different profiles, are App. 19516/06, Alexandridis v. Greece, 
Judgment of 21 February 2008, and Apps. 42837/06, 3237/07, 3269/07, 35793/07 & 6099/08, 
Dimitras et al. v. Greece, Judgment of 2 June 2010 − the Court held that requiring a person to 
publicly declare that he/she is not an Orthodox, in order to be permitted to take a solemn 
promise instead of an oath, constitutes a violation of article 9 ECHR. 
17  This doctrine had been repeatedly stated by the European Commission of Human Rights and was 
later assumed by the Court in App. 20704/92, Kalaç v. Turkey, Judgment of 1 July 1997, § 27; and in 
App. 30985/96, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 26 October 2000, § 60. With regard 
to the Commission’s decisions, see App. 7050/75, Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, 19 Decisions and 
Reports, pp. 19-20 (Rep. Com., 12 June 1979) (concerning a British pacifist sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for having distributed illegal leaflets among English soldiers in Northern Ireland); 
App. 10358/83, C. v. United Kingdom, 37 Decisions and Reports, p. 147 (conscientious objection to 
paying taxes in the percentage of the State budget aimed at military costs); App. 10678/83, V. v. 
The Netherlands, 39 Decisions and Reports, p. 268 (conscientious objection to contributing to the 
public system of pensions); App. 11579/85, Khan v. United Kingdom, 48 Decisions and Reports, p. 
255 (conflict between the laws governing religious and civil marriages); Dec. Adm. on App. No. 
14049/88 (conscientious objection to paying taxes in the percentage of the State budget aimed at 
financing legal abortions in France).  
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when individuals endeavour to adapt their conduct to their moral obligations in 
ordinary life through behaviour that does not strictly consist in religious teaching 
or correspond to specific ceremonial practices.
18
 Moreover, the ECtHR has stated 
that certain professional situations voluntarily assumed may entail additional 
specific restrictions on religious freedom, as in the case of the military.
19
 
The European Court on the other hand, has often drawn implicitly a 
distinction between state’s actions that have a direct and an indirect impact on 
religious freedom. In the Court’s view, the state interferes with the exercise of 
freedom of religion or belief when an individual’s behaviour is prevented or 
punished by a law or by other state activity directly aimed at restricting the 
manifestation, the worship, or the expansion of certain or of all religions. In these 
cases, the European Convention requires that the state justify the interference on 
the individual’s freedom according to article 9(2), especially proving that the 
restrictive measures are ‘necessary in a democratic society’. This was indeed the 
approach of the Court when it decided in favour of the applicant in the Kokkinakis 
case because the Greek courts, based on the national laws in force against 
religious proselytism, had sentenced a Jehovah’s Witness without enough 
evidence that he had been engaged in ‘improper proselytism’.
20
  
The same occurred in the Buscarini case, where the Court held that requiring 
newly elected members of Parliament to swear allegiance to the Constitution on 
                                            
18  For further details on this approach of the Strasbourg jurisdiction, see J. Martínez-Torrón & R. 
Navarro-Valls, The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe, cited 
in n. 10 above, pp. 228 et seq. 
19  See Kalaç v. Turkey, § 28. The Court affirmed that ‘this occurs particularly within a system of 
military discipline that by its very nature implie[s] the possibility of placing on certain of the 
rights and freedoms of members of the armed forces limitations incapable of being imposed on 
civilians’. This case involved the compulsory retirement of an officer of the Turkish army, 
decreed by the Supreme Military Council, for his membership of an allegedly Islamic 
fundamentalist movement supporting ideas contrary to the constitutional principle of 
secularism.  
20  See App. 14307/88, Kokkinakis v. Greece, Judgment of 25 May 1993. See J. Martínez-Torrón, 
‘Libertad de proselitismo en Europa: A propósito de una reciente sentencia del Tribunal 
europeo de derechos humanos’ in [1994] Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica 59-71; J. 
Gunn, ‘Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights’ in 
J.D. van der Vyver & J. Witte, (eds.), Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, Boston, 1996, 
pp. 305-330; P. Edge, ‘The Missionary's Position After Kokkinakis v Greece’, in [1995] 2 Web Journal 
of Current Legal Issues, available in http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/articles2/edge2.html. On the 
problems involved in determining a concept of proselytism in international law, see N. Lerner, 
‘Proselytism, Change of Religion, and International Human Rights’ in (1998) 12 Emory 
International Law Review, pp. 477-561.  
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the Gospels, on pain of forfeiting their parliamentary seats, was contrary to the 
provisions of article 9 ECHR.
21
 And a similar way of reasoning was followed by the 
Court in several cases that involved the use of Islamic headscarves or other 
religious symbols in public schools in different countries.
22
 Although the ECtHR 
decided almost always against the applicants,
23
 its analysis also began by 
recognising that imposing the prohibition of carrying certain religious symbols − 
on teachers or on students − constituted an interference with the applicants’ 
religious freedom and the State was obliged to provide a sound justification under 
article 9(2) ECHR. I must add, however, that in cases of prohibition of religious 
symbols the Court has been too deferential to the margin of appreciation that is 
normally recognised to States in the interpretation of legitimate limitations on 
religious freedom according to the same article 9(2).
24
 
                                            
21  See n. 16 above and accompanying text. 
22  See App. 16278/90, Karaduman v. Turkey, Judgment of 3 May 1993; App. 18783/91, Bulut v. 
Turkey, Judgment of 3 May 1993; App. 42393/98, Dahlab v. Switzerland, Judgment of 15 
February 2001; App. 44774/98, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (Grand Chamber), Judgment of 10 
November 2005; App. 26625/02, Köse and 93 other applicants v. Turkey, Judgment of 24 
January 2006; App. 65500/01, Kurtulmus v. Turkey, Judgment of 24 January 2006; App. 
27058/05 Dogru v. France and App. 31645/04, Kervanci v. France, Judgments of 4 December 
2008, both decided by the same chamber of the ECtHR, the same day and with almost identical 
text; and App. 43563/08, Aktas v. France, 14308/09, Bayrak v. France, App. 18527/08, 
Gamaleddyn v. France, App. 29134/08, Ghazal c. Francia, App. 25463/08, Jasvir Singh c. 
Francia, and App. 27561/08, Ranjit Singh c. Francia, all of them dated 30 June 2009 (the latter 
two decisions referred to sikh turbans). For a further discussion of these cases, see, for 
instance, S. Cañamares Arribas, Libertad religiosa, simbología y laicidad del Estado, Pamplona, 
2005, pp. 179-180; B. Rodrigo Lara, Minoría de edad y libertad de conciencia, Madrid, 2005, pp. 
399-403; N. Lerner, ‘How Wide the Margin of Appreciation? The Turkish Headscarf Case, the 
Strasbourg Court, and Secularist Tolerance’ in (2005) 13 Willamette Journal of International 
Law and Dispute Resolutions, pp. 65-85; B. Chelini-Pont & E. Tawil, ‘Brèves remarques sur 
l’arrêt Leyla Sahin’, in (2006-2007) 2 Annuaire Droit et Religions, pp. 607-611; T.J. Gunn, ‘Fearful 
Symbols: The Islamic Headscarf and the European Court of Human Rights in Sahin v. Turkey’, in 
(2006-2007) 2 Annuaire Droit et Religions, pp. 639-665; J. Martínez-Torrón, ‘Islam in 
Strasbourg: Can Politics Substitute for Law?’ in W.C. Durham, T. Lindholm & R. Torfs (eds.), 
Islam in Europe: Emerging Legal Issues, forthcoming in 2010.   
23  In a recent case, App. 41135/98, Ahmet Arslan et al. v. Turkey, Judgment of 23 February 2010, 
the Court decided in favour of the applicants but on that occasion the religious attire had been 
worn in the streets, not in an educational centre.  
24  For further details on the margin of appreciation doctrine, and in general on limitations on 
freedom of religion, see J. Martínez-Torrón, ‘Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law 
of the European Court of Human Rights’ in (2005) 19 Emory International Law Review 587-636, 
and the bibliography there cited.  
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The Strasbourg approach has been very different when dealing with ‘neutral’ 
laws, i.e. laws that pursue legitimate secular goals. When the legal duties imposed 
by a ‘neutral’ law collide with the moral obligations of certain individuals, these 
persons see their right to practice their religion or belief as being indirectly and 
nonetheless unavoidably restricted by that law − this accentuates the different 
types of conscientious objection.
25
 The immediate consequence is that a moral 
burden is placed upon the shoulders of these people, as they must choose 
between disobedience to the law and disobedience to their conscience − one 
receives a worldly punishment, the other entails a spiritual sanction. In those 
cases, the Strasbourg jurisdiction has apparently tended to deny that article 9 
offers any protection, affirming that there was not a State interference with 
religious freedom. In short, its analysis can be summarised as follows: it is not 
necessary to consider whether the State can provide a legitimate justification for 
the legislation under attack (according to article 9[2]) because the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (according to the description of its 
content in article 9[1]) has not actually been (directly) violated. 
Although there is not yet a conclusive doctrine of the ECtHR on the issue of 
conflicts between neutral laws and individuals’ freedom of conscience, we could 
mention three cases in which it is possible to observe some traces of the 
foregoing mode of reasoning. Significantly, all three cases referred to problems 
arising within the educational environment, which might lead to consider them as 
right to education cases rather than freedom of religion cases. One is Kjeldsen, in 
1976, which concerned the opposition of the parents of some students to 
compulsory sex education for teenagers in the public schools of Denmark. The 
case was decided − against the applicants − in the light of article 2 of the First 
Protocol and the Court proposed a restrictive interpretation of the parents’ right 
with regard to the religious and philosophical orientation of their children’s 
education. In brief, the Court held that the school authorities are not obliged to 
accommodate the parents’ claims of conscience against some educational 
contents, and that the State’s power to control the educational environment is 
only limited by the prohibition of indoctrination.
26
  
                                            
25  An extensive analysis of conscientious objections in international and comparative law, with 
numerous bibliographical and case law references, can be found in R. Navarro-Valls & J. 
Martínez-Torrón, Las objeciones de conciencia, cited in n. 2 above (there is also an Italian version: 
Le obiezioni di coscienza: Profili di diritto comparato, Torino, 1995).  
26  See n. 15 and accompanying text. For a more detailed analysis of the Kjeldsen decision, see R. 
Navarro-Valls & Martínez-Torrón, Las objeciones de conciencia ..., cited in n. 2 above, at 199-
203. 
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Twenty years later, the twin decisions Efstratiou and Valsamis dealt with the 
applications of two Greek secondary school students, Jehovah’s Witnesses, who 
refused, on religious grounds, to participate in the school parades organised in a 
national festivity.
27
 The European Court, in the light of article 9 of the Convention 
and of article 2 of the First Protocol (as interpreted in Kjeldsen), sustained the 
Greek government’s position and considered that the moderate sanction imposed 
to the students − one day’s suspension from school − did not violate the 
applicants’ rights under the ECHR.  
In my opinion, this interpretation of article 9 inverts the logical order of 
concepts in this matter. It is universally accepted that human rights must be 
construed broadly. Therefore, in order to understand the exact meaning of the 
freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in ‘practice’ it seems that we should 
approach the question in the following sequence. On the one hand, freedom to 
practice one’s religion or belief must be understood as protecting, in principle, 
every act of the individual when he obeys the dictates of his own conscience 
(religiously or non-religiously inspired). But on the other hand, paragraph 2 of 
article 9 − the limitations on religious liberty − will be utilised, when necessary, as 
a corrective element for a freedom that by its own nature tends to be exercised in 
an undefined and unpredictable way.  
Thus, we would manage to reconcile two paramount interests that can easily 
conflict with each other: the maximum degree of initial protection of the freedom 
of belief and the security that the legal order demands. Furthermore, we 
introduce an important assumption: the State has the burden of proof with regard 
to the necessity of a restrictive measure − i.e. it must affirmatively prove that, in a 
particular case of conflict, it is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to restrict the 
exercise of religious freedom. Following this approach would obstruct the 
development of policies that are a little sensitive towards religious freedom and 
that are especially harmful to minority groups. 
3. The European Court and the Issue of Objection to Blood Transfusions 
Turning now to the specific issue of conscientious objection to blood 
transfusions on religious grounds, the first remark is that this issue has never been 
                                            
27  App. 24095/94, Efstratiou v. Greece and App. 21787/93, Valsamis v. Greece, both of 18 
December 1996. The texts of both decisions are almost identical, as indeed were the facts in 
issue. The applicants argued that their conscience prohibited them from being present in a civic 
celebration in which a war was remembered and in which military and ecclesiastical authorities 
took part. 
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submitted directly to the ECtHR jurisdiction. If it comes in the future, the Court 
would most likely sustain the right to objection in the case of adults − even at 
their lives’ risk − considering that articles 8 and 9 ECHR move to respect the free 
will of a competent adult and therefore to require his informed consent before 
performing any medical intervention on his body (a different question is to what 
extent the Court would determine that public authorities are liable, and must 
compensate for damages, if they failed to respect this right). It is also predictable 
that the ECtHR would justify the imposition of a blood transfusion if the life or 
health of minors were at risk, in application of article 9(2) ECHR − religious 
freedom can be limited ‘for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. 
However, the issue of conscientious objection to blood transfusions has been 
raised in the Court implicitly or incidentally, and the Court has never affirmed that 
this type of conscientious objection should or could have any negative effect for 
the person or the institution involved. The issue has been raised implicitly in those 
cases in which the legitimate activity of Jehovah’s Witnesses was questioned by 
the national authorities for one or other reason, for it is well known that refusal of 
blood transfusion is a definite characteristic of the doctrine of that church. When 
dealing with these cases, the Court has never made any reference whatsoever to 
the possibility that the doctrine of Jehovah’s Witnesses in general, or its 
religiously grounded refusal of blood transfusions in particular, could make the 
activity of this church limitable or less legitimate.  
Thus, for example, in Kokkinakis, the ECtHR affirmed that the religious 
proselytism of Jehovah’s Witnesses was legitimate, and could not be prohibited or 
punished by the law, as far as it was not improper or abusive.
28
 In Manoussakis, 
also decided in favour of the applicant, the Court found that the Greek 
authorities’ restrictions on the opening of a worship place for Jehovah’s Witnesses 
were unjustified and excessive.
29
 In Tsavachidis, a case regarding the surveillance 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses by the Greek National Intelligence Service, the application 
was declared admissible − and the Commission reported that there was a 
violation of article 8 ECHR − but ended with a friendly settlement in which the 
Greek government submitted a formal statement declaring that ‘the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses are not, and will not in the future be, subject to any surveillance on 
account of their religious beliefs’.
30
  
                                            
28  See n. 20 and accompanying text. 
29  Manoussakis, cited in n. 14 above. 
30  App. 28802/95, Tsavachidis v. Greece, Judgment of 21 January 1999. By the time the friendly 
settlement was reached, the European Commission of Human Rights had already written its 
report on the merits of the case and expressed the opinion that there had been a violation of 
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In Paturel, a case regarding freedom of expression, the ECtHR decided in 
favour of the applicant, a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses that had written a very 
critical book against a French anti-sect association of Catholic inspiration, accusing 
it of persecuting religious minority groups in general and Jehovah’s Witnesses in 
particular; the Court found that the sanctions imposed on the applicant by the 
French courts had violated article 10 ECHR and could not be justified by the 
animosity demonstrated by the applicant in his accusations.
31
  
In two recent cases against Austria, the ECtHR held that the government’s 
refusal to grant Jehovah’s Witnesses the same legal status of other comparable 
religious communities was discriminatory and therefore violated article 9 ECHR 
read in conjunction with article 14 ECHR;
32
 in one of the decisions it is noted that 
among the reasons alleged by the Austrian government were this church’s ‘refusal 
to perform military service or any form of alternative service for conscientious 
objectors, to participate in local community life and elections and to undergo 
certain types of medical treatment such as blood transfusions’.
33
 
In addition, the Strasbourg jurisdiction has dealt incidentally with the issue of 
objection to blood transfusions by Jehovah’s Witnesses in two other cases. One of 
them referred to the denial of registration of Jehovah’s Witnesses as a religious 
community in Bulgaria. Among the reasons for the rejection the Bulgarian 
government explicitly mentioned and emphasised their doctrine on blood 
transfusions. The application was declared admissible by the European 
Commission of Human Rights in 1997 and the parties reached a friendly 
settlement in 1998. According to the terms of this settlement, the Bulgarian 
government agreed to register Jehovah’s Witnesses as a religious community 
whereas this church agreed − among other things − not to distribute forms among 
minors aimed at the refusal of blood transfusions, and accepted to respect 
Bulgarian law on medical care as well as to respect the free choice of each one of 
                                                                                                               
article 8 ECHR (thirteen votes to four) and that there had been no violation of article 9 ECHR 
(nine votes to eight). 
31  App. 54968/00, Paturel v. France, Judgment of 22 December 2005. For further details and a 
comment on this decision, see J. Martínez-Torrón, ‘Freedom of Expression versus Freedom of 
Religion in the European Court of Human Rights’ in A. Sajo, (ed.), Censorial Sensitivities: Free 
Speech and Religion in a Fundamentalist World, Budapest, 2007, pp. 245-247. 
32  App. 40825/98, Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas et al. v. Austria, Judgment of 31 July 
2008; App. 76581/01, Verein der Freunde der Christengemeinschaft et al. v. Austria, Judgment 
of 26 February 2009. 
33  Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas et al. v. Austria, above, § 26. 
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their adult members with regard to blood transfusions.
34
 It is not difficult to 
presume that, had the friendly settlement not been reached, the Court would 
have declared that the doctrine on blood transfusions was not a legitimate 
reason, under the European Convention, to reject registration as a religious legal 
person, especially taking into account the previous decision of the ECtHR in the 
Hoffmann case. 
Hoffmann v. Austria
35
 is, indeed, the case in which the ECtHR has given most 
consideration to the issue of conscientious objection to blood transfusions, even 
though the issue arose only in hypothetical terms. The applicant was Ingrid 
Hoffmann, a woman that had been baptised as Catholic and had married a 
Catholic in 1980, but later converted to Jehovah’s Witnesses. The couple had two 
children (born in 1980 and 1982, respectively) that had also been baptised and 
raised as Catholics. Three years after the marriage, the applicant instituted 
divorce proceedings against her husband. One year later, in 1984, the divorce 
proceedings still pending, she abandoned her husband and took the children with 
her by unilateral decision with the intention to educate them according to the 
tenets of her new religion − as she actually did. The divorce was pronounced in 
June 1986 but prior to that date, in January and March 1986 respectively, the 
district court and the regional court granted custody rights to the mother.
36
  
However, in September 1986, the Supreme Court of Austria overruled the 
decisions of the lower courts and granted custody to the father, considering that 
                                            
34  The Commission declared the application admissible in App. 28626/95, Khristiansko Sdruzhenie 
“Svideteli na Iehova” (Christian Association Jehovah’s Witnesses) v. Bulgaria, Dec. Adm. 3 July 
1997. The report of the same Commission, accepting the friendly settlement, was adopted on 9 
March 1998. There was a subsequent case in which the issue of objection to blood transfusions 
was mentioned: App. 39015/97, Lotter & Lotter v. Bulgaria. The applicants were two Austrian 
nationals living in Bulgaria to whom the government decided not to extend their residence 
permit because they were Jehovah’s Witnesses; the doctrine of this church, with explicit 
mention of blood transfusion, was indicated as ground for the government’s decision. The 
Court declared the application admissible on 6 February 2003, and sanctioned a friendly 
settlement on 19 May 2004. 
35  App. 12875/87, Hoffmann v. Austria, Judgment of 23 June 1993. For further details and a 
critical comment on this decision, see B. Rodrigo Lara, Minoría de edad y libertad de conciencia, 
Madrid, 2005; J. Martínez-Torrón, ‘Derecho de familia y libertad de conciencia en la 
jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humano’ in Derecho de familia y libertad de 
conciencia en los países de la Unión Europea y el derecho comparado, Bilbao, 2001, pp. 153-156. 
36  There is another interesting case concerning custody rights after a divorce between a Catholic 
husband and a wife that had converted to Jehovah’s Witnesses, but on this occasion the issue 
of objection to blood transfusions was not raised: App. 64927/01, Palau-Martinez v. France, 
Judgment of 16 December 2003. 
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he was in a better position for the upbringing of their children and that the 
mother had infringed an implicit marital agreement about the religious education 
of the children. With regard to this latter point, the Supreme Court considered 
that the lower courts had incurred ‘manifest illegality’ by not appreciating the 
violation of that implicit marital agreement by the mother − the national legislation 
on the religious education of children (Bundesgesetz über die religiöse 
Kindererziehung) provides that, in the absence of an explicit agreement, during the 
existence of the marriage neither parent may decide without the consent of the 
other that the child is to be brought up in a faith different from that shared by 
both parents at the time of the marriage or from that in which he or she has 
hitherto been brought up.
37
 On the other hand, the Supreme Court accepted the 
father’s argument about the possible risks for the children if they were integrated 
into the mother’s religion, namely a certain social isolation − they were living in 
the Tyrol, an area with a large Catholic majority − and a danger for their health 
should they need an urgent blood transfusion in the future.  
The ECtHR held that the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court had violated 
the applicant’s rights under article 8 ECHR (right to private and family life) in 
conjunction with article 14 (principle of equality). In essence, the ECtHR accepted 
that the Supreme Court could have legitimately adopted the same position with 
regard to which parent was more suitable for the children’s upbringing if its 
decision had been taken based only upon issues related to the children’s well-
being. But the European Court added that the Austrian Supreme Court had 
introduced a new element, the federal legislation on the religious education of 
children, which was based on the religion of parents, and in that respect held that 
‘a distinction based essentially on a difference in religion alone is not 
acceptable’.
38
 I will not go into the details of the Court’s reasoning here,
39
 but it is 
worth commenting on some aspects of the decision. 
The main reason mentioned by the ECtHR to decide in favour of the applicant 
was that it is not legitimate for a court to make a distinction ‘essentially based on 
a difference in religion’ between the parents when deciding which of them must 
be granted custody. This principle is correct but in my opinion was misapplied in 
the present case. The Supreme Court of Austria was not endeavouring directly to 
make a distinction between the parents on religious grounds. It was merely trying 
to analyse which parent was better qualified for custody taking into account 
                                            
37  See Hoffmann, § 15. 
38  Ibid., § 36. 
39  See, the bibliography cited in n. 35 above. 
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various factors − among them, the fact that the mother had forcibly taken the 
children during the divorce proceedings, had infringed the implicit marital 
agreement on the children’s education (in violation of the Austrian law) and was 
imposing on them her religious views, which included a drastic refusal of blood 
transfusions even in the case of a life threatening emergency.  
The Supreme Court was not judging the value of the mother’s religious 
doctrines but just assessing their potential impact on the children’s lives. In this 
respect, its conclusion was different from the one adopted by the lower courts 
but it must be noted that under Austrian law the decisions taken by the latter 
could only be overruled if the Supreme Court found that they had incurred 
‘manifest illegality’ − this is the reason why the Supreme Court argued on the 
base of the federal act on the religious education of the children. We should not 
forget, on the other hand, that both parents were well placed to take care of the 
children, the main difference being that the father would need some help from his 
mother.
40
 What the Supreme Court did, after all, was to balance this fact against 
the potential negative consequences that the religion of the mother could have 
for the children’s welfare, including her opposition to blood transfusions. 
With regard to the particular issue of the mother’s conscientious objection to 
blood transfusions as a result of her religious ideas, the ECtHR did not express any 
opinion about it but just acknowledged that the lower courts and the Supreme 
Court of Austria had evaluated this fact differently. The ECtHR seem to have left it 
to the discretion of the Austrian courts
41
 but, at the same time, invalidated the 
judgment of the Supreme Court because it linked this factor to the different 
religion of the mother after her conversion to Jehovah’s Witnesses.
42
 In other 
words, in its reasoning the Court was apparently more concerned about the equal 
consideration of the religious choices of the parents than about the potential 
effect of their respective choices on the children’s lives, in spite of mentioning 
that “in cases of this nature the interests of the children are paramount”.
43
 
It is probably for these reasons that the Hoffmann decision was adopted by a 
divided Court − five votes to four − and that the judges disagreeing with the 
majority wrote firm dissenting opinions.
44
 The four dissenting judges emphasised 
that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Austria was not based directly on a 
                                            
40  See Hoffmann, § 11. 
41  See Hoffmann, § 32-33. 
42  See ibid., §§ 33 & 36. 
43  Hoffmann, § 35. 
44  The dissenting judges were: Matscher (Austria), Walsh (Ireland), Valticos (Greece) and Mifsud 
Bonnici (Malta). 
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religious distinction but rather on an assessment, according to the Austrian law in 
force, of how the children’s best interest would be better guaranteed, and this 
included taking into account the effects of the parents’ diverse religious choices. 
These four judges underlined that the role of the ECtHR was not to hear an appeal 
from the Supreme Court of Austria on the provisions of Austrian law and as to 
whether Austrian court decisions contradicted Austrian law. One of the judges 
indicated that there had been no interference of Austrian courts with the 
mother’s fundamental rights, since the fact that the mother had taken the 
children with her by her unilateral decision did not give her any additional rights, 
and therefore the fact that the children were taken back to their father’s home 
following the final decision of the Supreme Court was not in itself an interference 
with the mother’s rights within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR.
45
  
Two dissenting judges
46
 specifically mentioned that the issue of objection to 
blood transfusions was very significant and the Austrian Supreme Court was 
perfectly entitled to take it into account when deciding on which of the parents 
was better qualified for custody. The Irish judge, in particular, emphasised that 
the mother’s objection to blood transfusions created a hazard of the health of the 
children. This was an objective factor, irrespective of its religious origin, and could 
be assessed discretionary by the Austrian courts when deciding on the children’s 
custody without incurring religious discrimination, for the existence of the hazard 
was independent from its religious cause:  
 
‘The father’s notice of appeal to the Supreme Court specifically 
mentioned the withholding of possible blood transfusion as the 
reason for seeking a reversal of the order of the lower court. That was 
an objective ground which a court might or might not, in any given 
case, regard as a sufficient ground for the transfer of custody. That is 
not a matter upon which this Court could usurp the discretion of the 
national court. The matter before the Supreme Court was a question 
of the hazard of the health of the children. In gauging the seriousness 
of the hazard the Supreme Court recognised that the cause of the 
hazard was, admittedly, the applicant’s new religious views. The 
reason or motives for the creation of the hazard are but secondary to 
the objective effect of the existence of the hazard. If the applicant’s 
attitude was not traceable to a religious belief the question before 
the national court would remain essentially the same. The fact that 
                                            
45  See dissenting opinion of Judge Matscher, § 1. 
46  See dissenting opinion of Judges Walsh and Valticos. 
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the hazard was brought into existence by a religious belief not shared 
by those upon whom it was sought to impose it does not create a 
situation where the removal of the hazard must necessarily, if at all, 
be regarded as a discrimination on the grounds of religious belief. The 
national court’s duty was to evaluate or weigh the effects as distinct 
from the cause’.
47
 
 
In my view, the dissenting opinion of Judge Walsh grasped which the crucial 
question was in Hoffmann much better than the majority opinion. It is true that, 
as the ECtHR affirmed, ‘a distinction based essentially on a difference in religion 
alone is not acceptable’.
48
 However, in this case the distinction made by the 
Austrian Supreme Court was not based on a religious difference alone but rather 
on the best interest of children, which, as the ECtHR itself recognised, are 
paramount in cases of this nature.
49
 This leads us to the real question underlying 
this type of case: can, or must, the assessment of the best interest of the child 
include elements related to the religious choices of parents? The answer of the 
European Court is negative. Personally, I think that this answer is unrealistic, for 
religion is important in people’s lives and therefore the religious choices of 
parents are bound to have effects on minors.  
Naturally, it would be unacceptable to establish a sort of priority order among 
religions or to judge the content of religious tenets − we have already seen that 
the Court has discarded this possibility with all good reason.
50
 However, ignoring 
the fact that the religious choices of parents affect children’s lives is wrong 
because it does not correspond to reality, and understanding reality is essential to 
assess the best interest of the child, which is the point of reference in this area. 
This is probably the reason why the European Commission, in the past, had held 
that it was appropriate for national authorities to adopt the necessary measures 
to guarantee continuity in the religious upbringing of children.
51
  
If the religious choices of parents are relevant for children’s lives, it seems 
reasonable that the courts take this factor into account when they decide which 
parent is better qualified for custody in a case of divorce, especially when, as in 
the case of conscientious objection to blood transfusions, those choices imply a 
                                            
47  Dissenting opinion of Judge Walsh, § 3.  
48  Hoffmann, § 36. 
49  See Hoffmann, § 35. 
50  See n. 14 and accompanying text. 
51  See App. 2648/65, X. v. The Netherlands, Dec. Adm. 16 February 1968, in Yearbook of the 
European Convention 11, pp. 354 et seq. (also available online in the data base of the ECtHR, 
HUDOC). 
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hazard of the children’s health. As Judge Walsh put it, a court can ‘evaluate or 
weigh the effects as distinct from the cause’. I am not saying that this should be 
the only or even the most significant criterion, but it can − and probably must − be 
used together with other criteria to tip the scales in favour of one or other of the 
parents seeking the custody of the children. 
